Israel’s Stand against AlAskari and Tabrizian Family Ties: Oil Smuggling and Money Laundering

The tangled web of espionage, terror funding, and illicit activity connecting figures like Sherif Al Askari, Mohammad Meghdad Tabrizian, Amir Meghdad Tabrizian, and Hezbollah is a growing issue that Israel and other nations are monitoring closely. At the heart of these activities lies a sophisticated network of individuals, many of whom are linked through both business and family ties, that exploit global loopholes to carry out money laundering and other crimes that destabilize the Middle East and beyond.

Key Players and Connections

Sherif AlAskari and Ali Fallahian, a former Iranian Minister of Intelligence, are central figures in this network. Fallahian, infamously linked to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires—a devastating terrorist attack that killed 85 people—has a history of orchestrating operations that further Iran’s influence worldwide. His close ties to AlAskari go beyond mere partnership; the two are also connected by marriage, as their wives are sisters. This family bond has fortified their allegiance, making their joint operations especially resilient.

· Sherif AlAskari has two passports, one from Iraq under the name Ali Sharif AlAskari and another from Iran under the name Sherif AlAskari. His family’s history is tied to the Islamic Dawa Party, a political organization responsible for the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. AlAskari’s current operations include illegal oil smuggling and money laundering.

· Ali Fallahian, known for his direct involvement in terrorism, has significant control over the oil smuggling routes. He remains a vital figure in Iran’s state-sponsored activities, including his collaboration with AlAskari on oil smuggling from Bandar Abbas to Iraq, where documentation is falsified to circumvent sanctions.

Oil Smuggling Operation

AlAskari and Fallahian’s joint oil smuggling operation is particularly concerning due to its sophistication and success in bypassing sanctions on Iranian oil. The operation begins in Bandar Abbas, a port city in Iran, where the oil is stored. From there, Panamanian-registered vessels transport the oil to Iraq, where its origin is concealed through falsified documents, allowing it to enter the global market undetected.

· Route and Methods: Using a network of vessels registered in Panama, the operation conceals the oil's origin, labeling it as Iraqi oil. This tactic allows AlAskari and Fallahian to profit from sanctions-evading oil sales on the international market.

· Laundering Proceeds: Once sold, the proceeds from this “dirty oil” are sent to the UK, where AlAskari’s daughter, living in London, plays a pivotal role. Married to Meghdad Tabrizian, who has strong ties to the Iranian regime, AlAskari’s daughter manages a network of companies that appear legitimate on paper but serve as money-laundering fronts.

London-Based Money Laundering Network

Meghdad Tabrizian, also known as Taby, has built a complex system for laundering the profits from AlAskari and Fallahian’s smuggling activities. His sons, Mohammad Meghdad Tabrizian (Taby) and Amir Meghdad Tabrizian, are actively involved in the process, assisting in running companies like London Surface Design Limited and London Heritage Stone Limited.

· Fake Contracts and Receipts: Through these firms, money is funneled as “working capital” with fake contracts and receipts created to provide a paper trail. This laundering system has allowed AlAskari’s network to inject illicit funds into the UK economy without raising red flags.

· Connection to Hezbollah: The cleaned funds are eventually passed to AlAskari’s daughter, who has close ties with the wife of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. This connection is troubling, as Hezbollah’s activities are well-documented, including its involvement in ongoing conflicts and ties with Iranian state operations. Funds funneled to Hezbollah through this network directly impact regional stability and Israel's security.

Residency and Security Risks

The AlAskari-Tabrizian network also managed to secure residency in the UK through questionable means. By using their connections within the UK Home Office, they exploited loopholes to gain legal status, a strategy that Abbas AlAskari, Sherif’s son, replicated this year.

· Exploitation of UK Immigration: The Tabrizians’ influence within the Home Office allegedly aided them in securing UK residency, offering them a secure base of operations. This residency has enabled them to operate under the radar, raising concerns about potential Iranian intelligence activities on British soil.

Abbas Sherif AlAskari: A Key Player

Abbas Sherif AlAskari, AlAskari’s son, uses a similar multi-passport strategy to evade law enforcement and carry out covert activities. With three passports—from Iraq, Iran, and Dominica—he can travel throughout Europe with ease. His Dominican passport, in particular, allows him greater freedom of movement within the European Union.

· Blackmail Schemes: Abbas is also implicated in blackmailing individuals, recording sensitive information on hidden cameras, and leveraging it against those who seek justice or pose a threat to his operations.

· Illegal Residency: Using the same connections as his sister and brother-in-law, Abbas also managed to secure residency in the UK through questionable means. This has enabled him to assist with the family’s money laundering operations from within the UK.

Recent Developments and Broader Implications

Israel’s recent killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut underscores the intensity of ongoing hostilities in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s funding—often tied to Iranian-backed operations like AlAskari’s—remains a critical threat to Israel and its allies. The killing marks a significant disruption in Hezbollah’s chain of command, although the organization remains active in its broader agenda against Israel.

Concerns for UK and International Security

The ease with which AlAskari, the Tabrizians, and their associates have exploited UK residency laws raises serious questions about the efficacy of British immigration controls, especially concerning individuals with known ties to terrorism and sanctioned regimes.

· Infiltration of British Systems: The Tabrizians and AlAskari family’s ability to secure legal residency is not only a legal oversight but a potential national security risk. Their presence in the UK makes it easier to exploit the country’s financial systems, creating an international hub for Iranian-sanctioned activities.

· UK as a Base for Illicit Activities: The UK’s favorable business and immigration policies inadvertently make it an attractive location for criminal networks. For individuals like AlAskari and his associates, the UK offers not only a financial hub but also a place to operate with relative impunity.

In Summary:

· Sherif AlAskari and Ali Fallahian collaborate on oil smuggling and terror financing, with the help of the UK-based Tabrizian family.

· Money laundering operations involve front companies in London, where funds are “cleaned” and funneled to Hezbollah.

· Residency schemes facilitated by contacts within the UK Home Office have provided a safe base for the network’s operations.

· Abbas AlAskari utilizes multiple passports to evade authorities, while engaging in blackmail and other illicit activities.